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Abstract
The effectiveness of policies to reduce the use of energy depend on the elasticity
of substitution between the various inputs and on the rate of technological
progress. This paper presents a theoretical model emphasising energy investments’
characteristics of uncertainty and irreversibility that result in testable hypotheses
concerning the relative values of substitution parameters and rates of technological
change in periods of high and increasing energy prices and in periods of low
prices.
Estimation results for a panel of sectors of the Dutch economy show that
the elasticity of substitution between energy and other inputs is low in periods of
low energy prices, whereas it is significantly higher in the preceding period of
high and increasing energy prices. Furthermore, energy-saving technological
progress in periods of high and increasing energy prices is also significantly
higher than if energy prices are low and falling.
The regression results suggest that, due this asymmetric response of firms
to changes in energy prices, taxing energy in the current period of low energy
prices will not yield substantial reductions in energy use of Dutch industry.
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1.  Introduction
Governments of most developed countries aim to substantially reduce energy use to
limit the emission of greenhouse gases (such as carbon dioxide). The effectiveness
of taxing energy use depends on the substitution elasticity between inputs in
production and on technological progress. Analysis of past experience may give
insight in the potential effectiveness of energy taxation to induce a decrease in
energy use.
Figure 1 Energy prices (1990=100) for eight sectors of industry of the Dutch
economy for the period 1973-1994.
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In this paper it is argued that in assessing the potential impact of
increasing the price of energy through taxation, the choice of the estimation period
is of crucial importance. Examination of the data indicates that the 1973-1994
period can be divided in two sub-periods. From 1973 to 1986, energy prices went
up, while prices have been observed to fall quite substantially in later years, as can
be seen from Figure 1.
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1Sectoral energy prices have been calculated on the basis of the share of the various
energy carriers in a sector’s energy use.3
This subdivision may be important as the economic consequences of energy price
increases and decreases are generally not symmetric. The literature on the potential
causes of asymmetric responses to energy price increases and decreases has focused
on the importance of irreversibility. If adjustment to changes in relative prices
involves adaptation costs, economic agents have an incentive to postpone the
adjustment. The incentive to postpone is even stronger when there is uncertainty
about the persistence of the change. If adjustments are costly and the future is
uncertain, the option value of waiting increases because new information is likely
to arrive over time, which may exceed the foregone benefits of adjusting
straightaway. This idea has been applied at various levels in the economy. The
literature focusing at the sectoral level, initiated by Hamilton (1988), attacks the
idea that production factors are able to relocate smoothly from one sector to
another. If production factors (mainly capital and labour) are specialised, it may be
optimal not to immediately leave adversely affected sectors and to move to
positively affected sectors, but to remain unemployed and wait for conditions to
improve. At the micro level, firms are likely to postpone irreversible investment
expenditures on both energy-saving technologies and their reversal towards energy-
intensive technologies (see for example Bernanke, 1983). This means that firms
will not respond immediately to energy price increases; but if they have responded,
energy prices will have to fall substantially before the investment is reversed.
Empirical studies seem to corroborate this explanation of asymmetric
responses. At the micro-economic level there is evidence pointing to the fact that
firms and consumers adapt faster (and stronger) to energy price increases than to
price decreases (e.g. Bacon, 1991; Borenstein et al., 1997; Gately, 1992;
Kirchgässner and Kübler, 1992; Mork, 1989; Ryan et al., 1996). At the macro-
level, asymmetries may also be important. It has been observed that economic
activity is more strongly affected by increases in the energy price than by decreases
(Dargay and Gately, 1994; Gardner and Joutz, 1996; Mork et al., 1994; Mory,
1993; Smyth, 1993). However, not all price increases will have an equally strong
impact on investments in energy-saving technologies. If energy prices increase
after a period of low prices, the change is merely a recovery that is unlikely to4
induce additional investments in energy efficiency. Only “all time highs” will
induce new investments in energy efficiency (Hamilton, 1996).
If such an asymmetric response exists, it has important policy
implications. Currently, energy prices are relatively low after a period of significant
price increases (1973-1986). This means that (part of the) industry has already
geared its technology to higher energy prices in the past.
2 Increasing energy tax
rates now (as part of environmental policy) is therefore expected not to have a
strong impact on investment behavior and technology choice, and thus result in
only modest reductions in energy use. More likely, firms are forced to simply incur
the rise in costs. This means that in order to achieve a substantial reduction in
energy use, energy prices should be increased considerably with potentially high
costs in terms of, for example, international competitiveness. However, in the post-
1986 period, energy prices are much lower and also less subject to fluctuations.
Given the positive correlation between the level of energy prices and their variance
(e.g. Ferderer, 1996), uncertainty is likely to be smaller in the post-1986 period. As
this may also affect the responsiveness of Dutch industry to changes in energy
prices (and hence to taxation), the impact of uncertainty should be analyzed.
To explore the consequences of irreversibility and uncertainty for the
environmental effectiveness of energy taxation in the Netherlands, the mechanisms
behind asymmetric responses are elucidated through the use of a simple investment
model presented in section 2. On the basis of this model we show in section 3 that,
following a period of energy price increases, prices will have to drop substantially
before energy-saving technologies are to be replaced by energy-intensive ones.
This drop is likely to be larger (i) the higher the adjustment costs, (ii) the faster
energy prices are expected to increase over time and (iii) the higher uncertainty
about future prices. In turn, this means that energy price recoveries will not have
much impact on energy use, suggesting that energy policy in periods of low energy
prices will not be very effective. In section 4, an empirical analysis is undertaken
for eight sectors of Dutch industry. The results are discussed in section 5, and the
conclusions ensue.
                                                     
2On average, the (economic) lifetime of a installed capital is about 15 to 20 years.5
2.  Investing under uncertainty for responses to energy price changes
In this section, an illustration is provided why asymmetric reponses to energy price
changes may arise. The main features causing the asymmetric response are the
sunk-cost nature of investments in new technologies, exacerbated by the existence
of uncertainty about the future. Suppose that there are two alternative technologies
available for firms. A given quantity of goods can be produced by either an energy-
intensive or a labour-intensive technology. Suppose that inputs for the energy-
intensive technology are E1 units of energy, and L1 units of labour, while the
corresponding inputs for the labour-intensive technology are E2 and L2,
respectively. From the assumption it is clear that E1>E2 and L1<L2. For notational
convenience, define DE= E1-E2 and DL= L2-L1. Furthermore, assume that the
adjustment costs (CA) from switching either from the energy-intensive to labour-
intensive technology or vice versa, are the same.
3
With respect to the prices of both types of inputs, we assume that the price
of labour (W) is constant and known throughout, but that future energy prices (PE)
are uncertain. Since most types of energy currently employed come from depletable
resources, we assume a time trend for prices, but disturbances may force the energy
price to deviate from its trend path. More specifically, the energy price is assumed
to follow a Brownian motion:
(1) dP P dt P dz EE E =+ as .
In this equation, a is the trend parameter and  dt dz e = , where e is a normally
distributed independent variable with a zero mean and a standard deviation of 1.
This implies that E(dPE)=aPE dt with variance s
22 Pd t E  (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994,
p. 70-71). Therefore, the expected energy price at time t equals:
(2) E(( ) ) Pt Pe EE
t =
0
a .
                                                     
3Note that this assumption seems unnecessarily restrictive. However, dropping it
would have clear-cut consequences for the qualitative results derived in this
section. If adjustment costs from energy-intensive to energy-saving technologies
are higher than the reversal (which seems plausible because of, for instance,
uncertainty with respect to the performance of new technologies and maybe also6
Now the costs and benefits of switching from the energy-intensive technology to
the labour-intensive technology can be determined. The change in technology
results in savings on energy expenses, but expenditures on labour increase. Taking
into account the adjustment costs CA, the value of switching to labour-intensive
(and hence energy-saving) technology equals:
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where r is the (exogenously determined) discount rate.
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After implementing the labour-intensive technology, the firm may decide
to reverse its investment if the price of energy is sufficiently low (see below). For a
certain energy price level PE, the value of this reversal option equals:
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What energy price is sufficiently high to induce the firm to switch towards the
energy-saving (i.e. labour-intensive) technology? In each period, the firm compares
the benefits of undertaking the investment (in terms of cost reductions achieved)
with the benefits of postponing the decision one period.  The latter include access
to more information about energy prices. Given the uncertainty that the firm faces,
postponing the decision reduces the probability of investing while such an
investment turns out to be unprofitable. In mathematical terms, the firm maximizes:
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because of environmental regulations requiring emission cleaning activities), the
conclusions of this section will only be strengthened.
4The results have been derived using dynamic programming, which is based on the
assumption that the price risk cannot be spanned by constructing an appropriate
market portfolio. If we would have dropped this (implicit) assumption, contingent
claims analysis could be used which would have enabled us to derive a risk-
adjusted discount rate. Using the capital asset market pricing approach, this
discount rate would be equal to r PM +fr s , wheref is the market price of risk and
r PM the correlation coefficient between market risk and the riskiness of the energy
price (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 185).7
The value W
ES
E P ()  is labeled the “termination value”. When the firm decides to
undertake the investment, its expected return is known. The expected return of
waiting (the second term in the brackets) is usually referred to as the “continuation
value”. The firm's optimal decision maximizes the net present value of the
investment option F
ES. As soon as the termination value exceeds the continuation
value, the investment is undertaken. The energy price for which this is just the case
will be referred to as the critical energy price  P E
ES
*
.
Applying Ito calculus, the following differential equation is obtained:
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This term captures the impact of price uncertainty on the critical energy price level
at which the switch towards the energy-saving technology will be carried out. The
general solution is of the form 
2 1
2 1 ) (
b b
E E E
ES P A P A P F + = where b1 and b2
represent the positive and negative roots respectively. The higher the energy price,
the higher the value of the energy-saving investment option. This implies that the
term with the negative root can be ignored: A2 equals zero. Then the critical value
of the energy price can be determined by using two additional conditions (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994; Pindyck, 1991). First, in the optimum it must hold that at the critical
energy price level, the value of the investment project is equal to the termination
value: F
ES ES =W : given the fact the investment is undertaken, waiting
apparently no longer has a positive net value (see equation 5). In the second place,
optimality requires that the option value function  F
ES  and the termination value
function W
ES  meet tangently at the critical price level:  FP
ES
P
ES =W . Using these
two additional conditions, it can be found that8
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Note that according to the NPV rule, the investments would be carried out as soon
as:
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The critical value under uncertainty, irreversibility and flexibility with respect to
the timing of the investment decision exceeds the NPV’s critical value because
1
1 1
1 >
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b
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After the switch towards the energy-saving technology, the energy price
may fall such that the firm may decide to reverse its decision and to re-install an
energy-intensive (but labour-saving) technology. In each period, it weighs the
benefits of reversing now and the benefits of postponing the switch:
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This time only the negative root (b2) plays a role: the lower the energy price, the
higher the likelihood that the reversal will be profitable and hence the higher the
value of the reversal option. Using  F
EI EI =W and FP
EI
P
EI =W , it can be found
that
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 and hence the calculated critical value
is lower than the value indicated by the NPV approach.
3.  Predictions of the theory
The analysis presented above implies that there is an asymmetry in the response to
energy price increases and decreases. The existence of adjustment costs, high
expected rates of energy price increases and uncertainty about future prices drive a
wedge between the critical energy price for a switch towards labour-intensive
technologies, and the critical price for its reversal. Hence, in response to a price
increase, investments will be undertaken. But a subsequent (moderate) drop in
energy prices will not induce the reversal towards the energy-intensive technology.
Figure 2 Inertia price gaps as a function of the expected rate of energy price
increases, for two different levels of uncertainty (s = 0.01 and s = 0.05).
Parameter values:  . 1 . 0 , 1 , 125 . 0 , 1 , 1 = = = = D = D A C W r L E
This point is illustrated in Figure 2, where critical energy price lines are
drawn for various time trends and for two levels of uncertainty (s = 0.01 and s =
0.05). From Figure 2 it is clear that there is a gap (an area between the two critical
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energy price levels) where prices can fluctuate without firms adapting their
production technologies. Expectations about future price developments play an
important role in deciding whether or not to invest in energy-saving technology.
Indeed, the critical price lines demonstrate that a higher (expected) price trend
induces the firm to invest sooner (although the reduction is not substantial), but
more importantly that the energy price should be much lower before the firm will
start contemplating to reverse its decision. The reason is that high trend values
compensate for stochastic drops in the energy price. The reversal will thus only
take place if the actual energy price is quite low: only then can it be expected to
stay at a low level for a substantial period of time (see equation 1). Furthermore,
the higher the uncertainty with respect to future prices, the longer a firm will
postpone investing: the higher the uncertainty, the larger the inertia gap.
This idea can also be illustrated in another way. Suppose that there are many firms
in the industry; one hundred to be precise. Suppose that the change in labour use is
identical for all firms and is equal to one unit, but that some firms are more energy-
inefficient than others: some firms can only reduce energy consumption with half a
unit while others can reduce it with 1.5 unit. Assume that all firms are uniformly
distributed between DE=0.5 and DE=1.5. That means that as the energy price
increases, some firms will decide to undertake the energy-saving investments, but
others will want to wait. This situation is plotted in Figure 3, where the number of
firms using energy-saving technologies (NES) is plotted on the vertical axis against
the energy price level on the horizontal axis. In the numerical example with a low
trend and low uncertainty ) 01 . 0 , 03 . 0 ( = = s a , the critical energy price ( P E
ES
*
)
for the firm that can achieve the highest savings in energy use, is about 0.7. If the
energy price increases above that critical level, an increasing number of firms will
implement the energy-saving technology. If the price continues to increase up to
2.0, all firms eventually switch towards the energy-saving (labour-intensive)
option.11
Figure 3 The number of firms applying energy-saving technologies as a function of
the energy price level for different combinations of expected rates of
energy price increases and variances (a=0.03,s=0.01; a=0.07, s=0.01;
and a=0.03, s=0.05) for a price increase and subsequent decrease.
Parameter values:  . 1 . 0 , 1 , 125 . 0 , 1 , 1 = = = = D = D A C W r L E
However, for a subsequent decrease in energy prices, at first none of the firms react
and only after the energy price has fallen sufficiently (to less than 1.4 in this
numerical example), firms reverse their investments and NES falls. Suppose that the
price of energy did not fall all the way to the point where all firms would have
reversed their investments, but only to intermediate price levels. Then only few (or
even maybe none) of the firms would have adapted their technologies yet and a
subsequent price recovery would again not evoke any responses. This would mean
that after a period of price increases followed by price decreases, energy policy
would be less effective in inducing investments in energy-saving technologies. The
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switching functions have also been drawn for the case of a higher trend
(. ,. ) a s == 007 001  and for a higher level of uncertainty (. ,. ) a s == 003 005 .
The inertia gap is again larger the higher the uncertainty of the energy price level
and the higher the expected rate of energy price increase.
From these two figures it is clear that the asymmetry in the response to
energy price changes will increase with a and s. If the upper critical level (i.e.,
switch towards labour-intensive technology) has just been attained, the firm will
undertake the investment. However, to reverse that decision, the energy price
should drop substantially. For a large range of price decreases, nothing will happen
in terms of energy use. The size of the inertia gap is larger (i) the higher the
expected rate of price increase and (ii) the more uncertainty about future price
levels. Of course, adaptation costs (CA ) also play a role: the higher these costs, the
larger the inertia gap.
4.  Empirical model
The theory presented in sections 2 and 3 has clear implications for energy policy in
periods of relatively low energy prices that we would like to test empirically.
Concerning the empirical analysis, we focus on the sectoral level because of the
lack of time-series data at the firm level. Two main hypotheses can be formulated
on the basis of the previous section. In the first place, theory predicts that at the
sectoral level, more substitution will take place in periods where energy price
increases result in “all time highs” than in periods of low prices, where increases
will be mere price recoveries. Changes in the technology used by individual firms
will show up in the sectoral data as input substitution. Therefore, substitution
elasticities are expected to be higher in energy price booms than in slumps. In the
second place, new technologies may result in efficiency gains. Little investments
aimed at increasing energy performance are expected to take place in periods of
low energy prices, and therefore technological progress is likely to be lower
especially in energy-saving technologies.13
Figure 4 Energy-capital ratio for the sectors of industry in our panel.
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Therefore, the prediction would be that in the post-1986 period
(characterized by relatively low energy prices) neither the substitution elasticities
between the various inputs nor the rates of technological progress would be
substantial, implying that energy taxation may not be an effective instrument in the
post-1986 period. However, there are two mitigating forces. The size of the “inertia
price region” is smaller the lower the expected rate of energy price increases, and
also the smaller the uncertainty about future energy prices. In the post-1986 period
energy prices have recovered only slowly, and there are even periods where energy
prices were observed to fall. Concerning uncertainty with respect to future levels of
energy prices, the energy price level is often positively correlated with the variance
of energy prices: relatively high prices are generally more volatile than relatively
low prices (Ferderer, 1996). This implies that the size of the inertia gap is expected14
to be smaller in the post-1986 period than in the pre-1986 period, and hence that the
production structure of the Dutch economy would be more sensitive to changes in
the relative prices of the various inputs.
Figure 5 Energy-labour ratio for the sectors of industry in our panel.
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We aim to test the degree of substitutability of the various inputs (energy,
labour and capital) and to analyze the type of technological progress (labour-
saving, capital-saving or energy-saving) in response to changes in the relative
prices of the various inputs. Figure 4 shows the energy-capital ratio for the sectors
in our panel. In general, the energy-capital ratio declines until the mid-eighties.
This decline may be caused by either input substitution or by energy-saving
technological progress (or both). From Figure 5 we can observe that the energy-15
labour ratio tends to increase for most of the sectors of industry our panel. Possibly,
labour-saving technological progress dominates.
In order to allow for different substitution elasticities, nested CES
functions will be estimated. The production functions of the various sectors are
assumed to have a similar structure, where capital and energy are combined at the
first level to produce an “intermediate output” (which will be referred to as Z),
which is then combined with labour at the second level: 
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In this equation the r’s are the substitution parameters; the elasticity of substitution
at level i (si) then equals 1/(1+ri). The nature of technological change can be
derived from the changes over time of the parameters AK, AE, BZ, and BL. Changes
over time of BL, for example, reflect labour-augmenting technological progress.
Because of the two-level structure of the production function, there is also a
parameter that measures the efficiency with which the composite input is used (BZ).
At the first level, energy and capital are combined into the intermediate
output Z in a profit-maximizing way. The optimization problem is:
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In (15), R is the price of capital and PZ the price of the intermediate output.
Rewriting the decision problem, the following Lagrangean can be derived:
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where l is the Langrange multiplier.
Similarly, we assume profit maximization at the second level, which
results in the following optimization problem:
(18) Z P WL PQ Z Z L - -   max ,
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In equation (18), P is the price of output. The first-order conditions of these two
optimization problems yield the standard result that the value marginal productivity
of each input should be equal to its marginal cost. In the case of labour, this is fairly
straightforward:
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The value marginal productivities of capital and energy should also equal their
respective marginal costs, being the respective input prices:
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On these two equations, the following optimal capital-energy ratio can be derived:
(24)
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By log-differentiating equations (21) and (24), the various rates of technological
progress can be derived:
(25) dq dl dw dp dbl -= - +- s s 22 1 () ( )
(26) de dk dr dp da da ek e -= - + - - s s 11 1 () ( ) ( )
Estimating equation (25) yields s 2 , and the rate of growth of labour-augmenting
technological progress. Equation (26) will yield information on s1  and on the
difference between dak and dae. Next, we derive an equation for the rate of growth
of the labour-capital ratio by equating the ratio of the cost of capital and labour to
the ratio of their respective marginal productivities:17
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Rewriting this equation in growth rates, the following equation can be derived:
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Two problems arise with the estimation of this equation. In the first place, we
cannot estimate this equation directly because Z (and hence dz) is not directly
observable. As is shown in Appendix A, this data problem can be addressed using
standard index theory.
In the second place, the estimation model (25), (26) and (29), is
underidentified. In equations (26) and (29), the intercepts reflect more than one
type of technological progress. This can be elucidated  by presenting the regression
equations:
(30)  dq dl dw dp c -= - +- s s 22 1 1 () ( )
(31)  de dk dr dp c e -= - + - s s 11 2 1 () ( )
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where each equation has a constant term:
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respectively. Concerning the substitution elasticities, we can identify s1  and s 2
respectively from equations (31) and (30) while c1 gives us the rate of labour-
augmenting technological progress (dbl). The intercept of equation (31) yields
information on the difference between dak and dae, but not the actual levels of the
rates of these two types of technological progress (see equation 34). The
interpretation of the intercept of equation (32) is even more complex, as is clear
from (35): this intercept captures both the difference in labour-saving technological
progress and technological progress that enhances the intermediate input, and
capital-augmenting technological progress.
This implies that we can not identify the growth rates of the capital-
augmenting and energy-augmenting technological progress (see Chang, 1994, p.
23). Only if either s1 0 =  or s2 1 = , the first term in c3  drops out and the rate of
capital-augmenting technological progress is known, and hence, from  c2, the rate
of energy-augmenting technological progress as well.
5.  Results
We have gathered data on a balanced panel of eight sectors of industry for the
Dutch economy. These sectors are agriculture, food and beverages, textiles and
clothing, paper industry, basic metal industry, building materials, chemical industry
and construction. These sectors are chosen on the basis of data availability for a
longer time period. Data on energy use and energy prices are not (yet) available for
the period before 1973 and after 1994 (at least not measured in a consistent way
with the 1973-1994 period), so we restricted the time period to the period 1973-
1994.
5
                                                     
5There are three main sources of the data: volumes and prices of value added and
labour are taken from the P-series of the National Accounts 1997 of CBS Statistics
Netherlands (CBS, 1998). Data on the stock of capital in 1990-prices are provided
by the CPB, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. Data on the use of19
Table 1  Summary of the parameters found for the various estimation periods
Period s1 s2
dbl dak dae
1974-1994 0.000492
* 0.488788 0.025149 -0.000529 0.023600
1974-1986 0.000634 0.504730 0.030439 -0.000895 0.041803
1986-1994 -0.000354
* 0.457320 0.014774 0.000049
* -0.003842
*
* Not significantly different from zero at 5%.
Applying iterative weighted least squares analysis while assuming common
effects,
6 we estimated the model consisting of equations (30)-(32) for three
different periods: the entire sample period, and the sub-periods of price increases
(1974-1986) and of price decreases (1986-1994). The actual results of the
regression are presented in Appendix B; the most important results are summarized
in Table 1.
As has been stated above, the nature of technological progress cannot be
identified unless the substitution elasticities have certain values. The elasticity of
substitution between capital and energy (s1 ) is found to be very close to zero or
even insignificant, and hence the identification problem disappears: coefficient c3
captures exclusively capital-augmenting technological progress, which means we
can calculate the rate of energy-augmenting technological progress from c2.
Concerning the entire sample period, capital and energy are found to be
complements while intermediate output and labour are found to be substitutes (the
elasticity of substitution is less than 1). Furthermore, over this period technological
change has been fairly substantial for labour and energy. The capital-augmenting
technology parameter is very close to zero, but this is probably caused by the
                                                                                                                          
energy and the price of energy are based on the publication De Nederlandse
Energiehuishouding  (CBS, various issues). Some data series had to be constructed;
the methodology applied is described in Appendix A.
6That is, no sector specific dummies have been included. Apart from running
common effects panel estimations, we also ran fixed effects estimation regressions
(thus allowing for sector-specific results). As can be seen from Appendix C, the20
complementarity of capital and energy.
7 On the basis of this regression one may
conclude that energy pricing policies are expected to be fairly effective: input
substitution and technological progress are fairly large.
However, subdivision of the entire sample period in a period of general
price increases (1974-1986) and decreases (1986-1994) contradicts this conclusion:
the coefficient estimates differ substantially between the two sub-periods discerned.
In the period of increasing prices, the elasticity of substitution between capital and
energy is low but significantly different from zero, while it became insignificant in
the period of price decreases. Furthermore, in the first period technical progress in
labour was slightly above 3% and in energy use even over 4%. In the period of
price decreases, labour-augmenting technological progress fell to less than 1.5%
and energy-augmenting technical progress even fell to zero. This suggests that
indeed the two periods differ: an asymmetry exists between periods of high and
increasing energy prices (where technological progress and the elasticity of
substitution are fairly substantial) and periods of low energy prices (where both
technological progress and substitution elasticities are low). This implies that it is
very likely that an increase in the price of energy through taxation is not going to
generate a substantial reduction in energy use. That means that estimating the
effectiveness of energy taxation on the basis of the entire post-1973 period is likely
to yield an overestimation of the true effectiveness.
6.  Conclusions
This paper aims to shed light on the effectiveness of environmental policy in
periods of high and low energy prices. It is argued that while firms are likely to
invest in energy-saving technologies when energy prices hit all-time highs, they are
unlikely to reverse the investment in periods of lower energy prices. This implies
that in periods of relatively low energy prices, small increases in energy taxation
will not induce any changes in the production structure. Therefore, energy taxes are
                                                                                                                          
general results of the common effects estimations are consistent with the results of
the fixed effects analysis (presented in detail in Appendix B).21
not expected be a strong instrument of environmental policy in periods of low
energy prices. In assessing the environmental effectiveness of energy taxation, only
the period of relatively low and stable energy prices should be used. Using a time
series that includes periods where the energy price was found to hit all-time highs,
the firms’ possibilities to adapt will be overestimated. However, looking at the post-
1986 experience, in that period energy prices are fairly low and have a low
variance. This means that the size of the inertia gap is lower in that period, so that
taxation for environmental purposes may be effective after all.
On the basis of a panel analysis of eight Dutch industrial sectors, we
conclude that there are marked differences in the substitution elasticities and
technological progress parameters between the period of high and increasing prices
(1974-1986) and the period of relatively low and stable prices (1986-1994). In the
latter period, capital and energy are found to be complements while the elasticity of
substitution between labour and the capital-energy composite input also turns out to
be lower than in the pre-1986 period. Furthermore, when prices generally
increased, energy-saving technological progress was over 4% while it is
insignificant in the post-1986 period.
These results suggest that energy taxation is not likely to be a very
effective instrument in periods of relatively low energy prices, as is currently the
case. If the Dutch government decides to increase the price of energy through
taxation, the subsequent reduction in energy use will not be substantial while firms
will have to incur the higher costs, with potentially harmful consequences for
international competitiveness.   
                                                                                                                          
7Another explanation may be the continuous reductions in labour time, implying a
lower utilization rate of capital.22
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Appendix A Data construction
Concerning the data used in this paper, three series had to be constructed: the prices
and quantities of intermediate output from the first level Z and the user cost of
capital. The intermediate (composite) output in constant prices can be calculated as
the nominal composite output divided by its price index. The value of the
composite output in nominal terms equals nominal capital expenditures plus
nominal energy expenditures:
(A.1) E P RK Z P E Z + º .
If we re-scale the prices such that in the base-year PE=R =1, K and E can be
calculated in base-year prices. Then composite output Z is simply Z=K+E. This
means that we can calculate the price index of this combined output Z as a
weighted average of the price indices of the constituent parts:
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Dividing expressions (A.1) and (A.2) yields the volume of input Z.
The (nominal) user cost of capital is not calculated in the usual way.
8
Here, we made use of data on the stock of capital (measured in 1990-prices) kindly
provided by CPB, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. We
constructed capital income resulting from production as the gross operating surplus
corrected for wage income of self-employed, were self-employed earn the same
wage rate as employees. The nominal rental price of capital is now simply
calculated as capital income (in current prices) divided by the stock of capital in
1990-prices. Finally, given data on the volume of labour input (L), capital input (K)
and energy input (E), and their respective prices (W, R and PE), we can construct
gross output in nominal terms as value added in nominal terms plus the value of the
energy input:  PQ WL RK P E E =++ , where WL+RK equals nominal value
added.
                                                     
8The most simple Jorgenson type of user cost of capital is  ) log ( d + D - = I I P i P R ,
where PI is the purchase price of a unit of capital, i is the (nominal) interest rate,
and d is the (constant) rate of depreciation.25
Appendix B Common-effects estimation results
The regression results for the three estimation periods (1974-1994, 1974-1986 and
1986-1994) are presented below.
Table B.1 Estimation results for the entire sample period (1974-1994)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
s 2 0.488788 0.064726 7.551644 0.0000
dbl 0.025149 0.006198 4.057429 0.0001
s1 0.000492 0.000314 1.566003 0.1180
dak – dae -0.024129 0.006071 -3.974491 0.0001
c3 -0.000529 0.000112 -4.724527 0.0000
S.E. of regression 0.053435     Mean dependent var 0.030893
Durbin-Watson stat 1.989492     S.D. dependent var 0.042262
    Sum squared resid 0.054251
Table B.2 Estimation results for the period of price increases (1974-1986)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
s 2 0.504730 0.080529 6.267654 0.0000
dbl 0.030439 0.008632 3.526160 0.0005
s1 0.000634 0.000311 2.038500 0.0424
dak – dae -0.042698 0.007087 -6.025124 0.0000
c3 -0.000895 0.000137 -6.541281 0.0000
S.E. of regression 0.049564     Mean dependent var 0.037877
Durbin-Watson stat 1.855769     S.D. dependent var 0.043813
    Sum squared resid 0.027023
Table B.3 Estimation results for the period of price decreases (1986-1994)
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
s 2 0.457320 0.088029 5.195075 0.0000
dbl 0.014774 0.007634 1.935264 0.0543
s1 -0.000354 0.000720 -0.491649 0.6235
dak – dae 0.003891 0.007522 0.517297 0.6055
c3 4.88E-05 0.000124 0.394853 0.6934
S.E. of regression 0.061174     Mean dependent var 0.025270
Durbin-Watson stat 2.094879     S.D. dependent var 0.040900
    Sum squared resid 0.02619626
Appendix C Fixed effects estimation results
We also ran fixed-effect regressions where the technological progress parameters
are allowed to differ (the elasticities of substitution are still assumed to be the same
across all sectors of industry).
Table C.1 presents the results with respect to the common elasticities of
substitution. These results are very similar to the ones derived from common
effects estimation.
The technological progress parameters differ across sectors. For the whole
sample period only three or four out of eight sectors produce significant
coefficients with respect to energy saving and capital saving as can be seen from
Table C.2. For the sub-periods we find results (not reported here) which are very
similar to the common effects results in Section 4. For the first sub-period the same
sectors produce significant coefficients with respect to technological progress. For
the second sub-period all technology parameters are insignificant, except one: In
the period 1986-1994 we find labor-augmenting technological progress in the food
and beverages industry of 4.7%.
Table C.1 Results from fixed effects estimations
Period s1 s 2
1974-1994 0.000478
* 0.447070
1974-1986 0.000630 0.478026
1986-1994 -0.000360
* 0.402200
* Not significantly different from zero at 5%.
Table C.2 Results from fixed effects estimations for the period 1974-1994
Period dbl dak dae
Agriculture 0.017227
* -0.000105
* 0.00509
*
Food and beverages 0.039362 -0.000624 0.028606
Textiles and clothing 0.035026 -0.000523 0.038628
Paper industry 0.037968
* -0.000583 0.034521
Basic metal industry 0.017785
* -0.000978 0.032746
*
Building materials 0.015242
* -0.003342
* 0.012503
*
Chemical industry 0.045138
* -0.001603
* 0.010099
*
Construction 0.006291
* -0.001002
* 0.035350
*
* Not significantly different from zero at 5%.